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Abstract 
	 This	paper	elaborates	important	systemic	interrelationships	between	firms'	
strategic	choices	of	product	architectures	and	organization	architectures,	and	
between	firms'	architectural	choices	and	the	industry	structures	and	
competitive/cooperative	dynamics	that	emerge	in	an	industry.	We	formalize	a	
"Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis"	suggesting	that	organizational	architectures	desired	
by	firms	influence	their	choices	of	product	architectures.	We	embed	firms'	strategic	
architectural	decisions	in	a	co‐evolutionary	model	linking	product	market	evolution,	
firms'	architectural	choices,	and	industry	evolution.	We	invoke	both	transaction	
costs	and	capabilities	perspectives	to	suggest	how	firms'	assessments	of	their	
relative	potential	for	capturing	gains	from	specialization	versus	gains	from	trade	
influence	their	strategic	architectural	choices.	We	develop	concepts	of	architectural	
commonality,	architectural	specificity,	industry	standard	architectures,	and	firm‐
specific	architectures	to	analyze	strategic	implications	of	firms'	architectural	choices.	
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INTRODUCTION	
	
In	their	paper	on	the	influence	of	modular	product	architectures	on	market	and	
organization	strategies,	Sanchez	and	Mahoney	(1996)	argued	that	‘products	design	
organizations,’	suggesting	that	the	product	architecture	a	firm	uses	will	tend	to	be	
reflected	in	the	organization	architecture	the	firm	adopts	to	develop,	produce,	and	
support	its	products.	Subsequently	labeled	the	‘mirroring	hypothesis’	by	Colfer	
(2007)	and	formalized	by	Colfer	and	Baldwin	(2010),	numerous	studies	have	found	
considerable	empirical	support	for	Sanchez	and	Mahoney's	proposition.	Colfer	and	
Baldwin's	(2010)	review	of	102	empirical	studies,	for	example,	found	that	the	
mirroring	hypothesis	was	supported	in	69%	of	all	cases	reviewed.1	
	 In	a	footnote	in	their	1996	paper,	Sanchez	and	Mahoney	(1996:fn.8,	p.74)	also	
suggested	that	widespread	adoption	of	modular	product	architectures	by	firms	in	
some	industries	appears	to	have	led	to	the	emergence	of	(in	effect)	modular	industry	
architectures	in	which	‘globally	dispersed,	loosely	coupled	organizations’	can	freely	
plug	and	play	in	developing,	producing,	assembling,	and	servicing	the	components	
used	in	an	industry's	modular	product	architectures.		
	 Subsequent	research	has	sought	to	clarify	more	generally	how	firms'	choices	of	
product	architectures	(and	by	implication,	organization	architectures)	may	lead	to	
different	kinds	of	competitive	and	cooperative	inter‐firm	dynamics	in	an	industry	
(Sanchez	2008,	2012;	Furlan,	Cabigiosos,	and	Camuffo,	2013).	In	addition	to	
exploring	the	influences	of	modular	versus	non‐modular	product	architectures	on	
organizations	and	industries,	for	example,	research	has	suggested	that	the	extent	of	
competitive	versus	cooperative	interactions	among	firms	in	an	industry	may	depend	
																																																								
	
1	In a retrospective on their 1996 paper, Sanchez and Mahoney (2013) suggested several 
managerial and organizational factors that may explain why some firms do not adopt organization 
architectures that exactly mirror their product architectures.	These include cognitive factors (Do 
managers realize the speed and flexibility advantages that can result from adopting a modular 
development process and corresponding modular organization design?), risk and capability 
factors (Are managers willing and able to lead the strategic organizational changes needed to 
implement modular development processes and modular organization designs?), and 
organizational commitment and discipline factors (Will development staff adhere to the 
principles of a modular development processes, especially with respect to conforming to the 
standardized interface specifications in a modular architecture?). 	
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significantly	on	whether	the	architectures	used	in	an	industry	are	open	systems	in	
which	many	firms	can	participate	or	closed	systems	controlled	by	individual	firms	
for	their	exclusive	use	(Schilling	and	Steensma	2001).		
	 Research	has	also	begun	to	consider	the	ways	in	which	and	the	extent	to	which	
firms'	choices	of	next‐generation	product	architectures	may	be	interlinked	with—
and	thus	influenced	by—their	current	or	desired	organization	structures	and	by	the	
inter‐firm	dynamics	in	an	industry.	In	an	early	study	of	Japanese	auto	industry	
supply	chains,	Sako	(2003)	observed	that	a	firm's	suppliers'	capabilities	and	
relationships	appeared	to	influence	the	firm's	choices	of	components—and	thereby	
the	component	characteristics	of	the	firm's	product	architectures.		Sanchez	(2008,	
2012)	suggested	that	managers'	beliefs	about	current,	emergent,	and	likely‐to‐
emerge	industry	structures	are	likely	to	influence	their	choice	of	modular	versus	
non‐modular	architectures	and	open‐system	versus	closed‐system	architectures.	
Most	recently,	MacDuffie	(2013:	13)	has	suggested	that	various	‘context‐specific	
antecedents’	can	influence	the	ways	firms	define	modules	in	their	architectures,	
noting	that	there	may	be	a	‘reverse	causality’	in	the	relation	between	product	and	
organization	designs.		
	 A	theoretically	important	implication	of	this	stream	of	research	is	that	the	
causal	relationships	between	product	architectures,	organization	architectures,	and	
industry	competitive	and/or	cooperative	dynamics	may	not	be	unidirectional,	but	
rather	may	be	reciprocal	and	bi‐directional—i.e.,	systemic	in	nature.	In	essence,	this	
research	has	begun	to	suggest	that	firms'	decisions	about	product	architectures	may	
be	systemically	intertwined	with—and	thus	are	unlikely	to	be	made	in	isolation	
from—strategic	concerns	about	a	firm's	organization	architecture	and	how	
alternative	organization	architectures	may	affect	the	nature	of	the	interactions	a	
firm	will	have	with	other	firms	in	its	industry.	Nevertheless,	as	Campagnolo	and	
Camuffo	(2010)	have	suggested,	a	theoretical	framework	that	attempts	to	identify	
and	reconcile	the	causal	relationships	between	product	architectures,	
organizational	designs,	and	industrial	production	systems	has	yet	to	be	put	forward.		
	 In	this	paper,	we	seek	to	extend	and	deepen	the	architectural	perspective	on	
firms'	strategic	organizing	decisions	by	elaborating	a	set	of	systemic	
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interrelationships	between	firms'	choices	of	product	architectures	and	organization	
architectures,	on	the	one	hand,	and	between	firms'	architectural	choices	and	the	
industry	structures	and	inter‐firm	competitive	and	cooperative	dynamics	that	
emerge	in	an	industry,	on	the	other	(Boisot	and	Sanchez	2010).	To	do	so,	we	
develop	a	general	model	from	which	we	derive	two	broad	propositions.	First,	our	
model	suggests	that	firms'	organization	architectures	do	not	follow	unilaterally	
from	firms'	choices	of	product	architectures,	but	rather	that	firms	choose	product	
and	organization	architectures	in	a	joint	decision	process.	Second,	our	model	
suggests	that	firms'	strategic	choices	of	product	and	organization	architectures	both	
influence	and	are	influenced	by	the	competitive	and	cooperative	dynamics	that	
currently	exist	in	an	industry—or	that	firms	believe	could	emerge	in	an	industry	
(Pitelis	and	Teece	2009).		
	 To	elaborate	our	model,	we	suggest	that	the	influence	of	product	
architectures	on	organization	architectures	recognized	in	the	mirroring	hypothesis	
needs	to	be	complemented	by	a	Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	(‘RMH’),	which	
essentially	holds	that	the	organizational	architectures	that	firms	believe	may	be	
possible	and	advantageous	to	adopt	in	an	industry	will	influence	(i.e.,	be	reflected	
in)	their	choices	of	product	architectures.	As	we	suggest	in	Figure	1,	the	RMH	
‘closes	the	loop’	to	provide	a	more	complete	representation	of	what	we	suggest	are	
key	systemic	interdependencies	in	firms'	strategic	decisions	about	their	product	and	
organization	architectures.		
	
<<<‐‐‐		Insert	FIGURE	1	Here		‐‐‐>>>	
	
	 We	then	embed	our	representation	of	a	firm's	joint	decision‐making	about	
product	and	organization	architectures	in	a	co‐evolutionary	model	linking	product	
market	evolution	(represented	by	emergent	market	opportunities	served	by	
entrepreneurial	action),	firms'	choices	of	product	architectures	and	organization	
architectures,	and	industry	evolution	(represented	by	changes	in	the	architectures	
used	in	an	industry	and	by	associated	changes	in	competitive	and	cooperative	inter‐
firm	dynamics),	as	illustrated	in	Figure	2.	
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<<<‐‐‐INSERT	FIGURE	2	HERE‐‐‐>>>	
	
	 The	architectural	choice	process	at	the	heart	of	our	co‐evolutionary	model	
suggests	that	a	firm's	joint	choice	of	product	and	organization	architectures	will	be	
driven	in	important	part	by	its	assessments	of	the	relative	potential	for	capturing	
gains	from	specialization	versus	gains	from	trade	in	alternative	pairings	of	product	
and	organization	architectures	judged	to	be	feasible	within	the	firm's	evolving	
market	and	industry	contexts	(Jacobides,	2005;	Jacobides	and	Billinger,	2006;	
Sanchez	2008,	2012).	Our	model	also	suggests	that	in	the	aggregate,	firms'	weighing	
of	potential	gains	from	specialization	and	from	trade—and	their	resulting	decisions	
about	the	product	and	organization	architectures	it	would	be	most	advantageous	to	
adopt—drives	the	strategic	evolution	of	the	architectures	used	in	an	industry	and	
the	competitive	and	cooperative	industry	dynamics	enabled	by	those	architectures.	
Our	discussion	is	developed	in	the	following	way.	
We	first	put	forward	some	essential	concepts	for	distinguishing	different	
kinds	of	product	and	organization	architectures	that	enable	different	kinds	of	
competitive	and	cooperative	dynamics	in	an	industry.	We	introduce	concepts	of	
architectural	commonality	and	architectural	specificity	that	we	then	use	to	derive	
concepts	of	industry	standard	architectures	and	firm‐specific	architectures.		
These	essentially	technical	representations	of	the	architectures	used	in	an	
industry	enable	our	strategic	analysis	of	how	firms'	architectural	choices	are	likely	
to	influence	inter‐firm	competitive	and	cooperative	dynamics	in	an	industry.	We	
identify	four	fundamental	combinations	of	architectural	choices	and	resulting	
industry	dynamics	available	to	firms,	each	of	which	is	likely	to	lead	to	different	
kinds	of	competitive	and	cooperative	inter‐firm	dynamics.		
We	then	suggest	how	the	industry	architecture	contexts	we	identify	offer	
different	potentials	for	achieving	important	strategic	advantages.	We	first	draw	on	
transaction	costs	economics	to	suggest	how	firms'	choices	of	architectures	are	likely	
to	affect	both	their	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	(Langlois,	2006;	Baldwin	
2008).	We	then	draw	on	the	capabilities	perspective	in	strategy	to	consider	how	a	
Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	‐	26	August	2013	
	 7
firm's	assessments	of	its	relative	potential	for	capturing	gains	from	specialization	
versus	gains	from	trade	is	likely	to	influence	its	strategic	choices	of	product	and	
organization	architectures,	and	thereby	the	extent	to	which	its	interactions	with	
other	firms	in	its	industry	are	likely	to	be	competitive	or	cooperative	in	nature	
(Jacobides,	2005;	Jacobides	and	Billinger,	2006;	Sanchez,	2008,	2012).		
We	then	draw	on	these	analyses	to	elaborate	the	essential	theoretical	
rationale	motivating	our	Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	and	our	co‐evolutionary	
model	linking	product	market	evolution,	firms'	architecture	choices,	and	industry	
evolution.	
	 We	conclude	by	suggesting	what	we	believe	are	some	of	the	most	important	
contributions	that	our	analysis	of	the	influence	of	product	and	organization	
architectures	on	firm	strategies	and	industry	dynamics	brings	to	both	strategy	
theory	and	to	theories	of	economic	organizing.	
	
	
TYPES	OF	ARCHITECTURES	
	
We	begin	our	analysis	by	distinguishing	kinds	of	product	and	organization	
architectures	that	are	likely	to	have	different	influences	on	the	extent	to	which	an	
industry	will	be	characterized	by	competitive	or	cooperative	inter‐firm	dynamics.	
We	first	introduce	the	concepts	of	architectural	commonality	and	architectural	
specificity,	which	we	then	use	to	distinguish	whether	a	firm	is	using	a	firm‐specific	
architecture	or	an	industry	standard	architecture.	Our	subsequent	discussion	uses	
these	essentially	technical	distinctions	among	architectures	to	suggest	how	and	why	
firms'	architectural	choices	influence	inter‐firm	competitive	and	cooperative	
dynamics	in	an	industry.		
	
Product	and	organization	architectures	
We	base	our	analyses	on	the	established	concept	of	product	architecture	defined	as	
(i)	the	decomposition	of	a	product	design	into	functional	components,	and	(ii)	the	
interfaces	between	functional	components	that	determine	how	the	components	will	
interact	when	they	function	together	in	a	product	design	(Sanchez	and	Mahoney	
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1996;	Baldwin	and	Clark,	2000;	Sanchez	2000;	Schilling,	2000).	We	also	adopt	an	
analogous	concept	of	organization	architecture	defined	as	(i)	the	decomposition	of	
an	organization	design	into	functional	components	(organizational	units	that	
perform	various	functions),	and	(ii)	the	interfaces	between	functional	units	that	
determine	how	the	units	interact	when	they	function	together	in	an	organization	
design	(Sah	and	Stiglitz,	1986;	Hoetker	2006;	Sanchez	and	Mahoney,	2013).	
	 In	our	analyses,	we	assume	that	both	the	Mirroring	Hypothesis	and	our	
Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	hold—i.e.,	that	a	firm	will	seek	to	achieve	close	
alignment	of	its	product	and	organization	architectures	(Sanchez	and	Mahoney	
1996;	Baldwin	2008;	Colfer	and	Baldwin	2010).	For	brevity,	we	therefore	often	use	
the	term	‘architectures’	to	refer	jointly	to	a	firm's	product	and	organization	
architectures,	which	in	our	analysis	we	assume	will	‘mirror’	each	other	to	a	
significant	extent.2	
	
Architectural	commonality	and	architectural	specificity	
The	product	and	organization	architectures	that	various	firms	adopt	may	differ	in	
the	ways	they	have	been	strategically	partitioned	into	functional	components,	and	in	
the	ways	that	interfaces	have	been	specified	to	govern	the	interactions	between	the	
functional	components	in	an	architecture	(Sanchez,	1999;	Baldwin	and	Clark,	2000;	
Brusoni,	Principe,	and	Pavitt,	2001;	Baldwin,	2008).	For	the	purposes	of	our	
analyses,	we	distinguish	the	architectures	firms	adopt	in	an	industry	by	the	extent	to	
which	they	share	significant	architectural	commonalities	or	exhibit	significant	
architectural	specificities	in	the	components	and	interfaces	they	use.		
																																																								
	
2	The	rationale	for	the	mirroring	hypothesis	is	twofold:	Garud	and	Kumaraswamy	(1995:	
98)	suggested	broadly	that	an	organization	system	design	must	‘parallel’	a	technological	
system	design	in	order	to	achieve	economies	of	substitution.	Sanchez	and	Mahoney	(1996)	
then	suggested	that	the	information	structure	provided	by	the	interfaces	in	a	modular	
architecture	may	provide	embedded	coordination	for	a	firm's	development	activities,	
thereby	improving	managerial	and	organizational	efficiencies.	Sanchez	(2012)	has	drawn	
on	these	two	perspectives	to	propose	a	principle	of	architectural	isomorphism	that	holds	
that	firms	whose	product	and	organization	architectures	are	aligned	will	be	able	to	achieve	
inherently	more	efficient—i.e.,	lower	cost	and	faster—development,	production,	and	after‐
service	processes	than	firms	whose	product	and	organization	architectures	are	not	aligned.	
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	 Architectural	commonality	refers	to	the	property	of	architectures	that	have	
been	strategically	partitioned	into	similar	kinds	of	functional	components	and	that	
have	adopted	similar	interface	specifications	for	governing	the	interactions	of	their	
functional	components.	Firms	that	have	adopted	product	architectures	with	high	
levels	of	commonality	may	to	that	extent	provide	each	other	with	components	that	
can	‘plug	and	play’	in	each	other's	product	architectures	(Sanchez,	2008,	2012;	
Cabigiosu	and	Camuffo,	2012).	Firms	that	have	adopted	product	and	organization	
architectures	with	high	levels	of	commonality	will	also	to	that	extent	be	engaged	in	
similar	kinds	of	development,	production,	customer	support,	and	other	functional	
activities.	High	levels	of	product	and	organization	architectural	commonality	among	
firms	enable	those	firms	to	more	readily	provide	product	components	and	
development,	production,	and	service	activities	to	each	other,	and	to	otherwise	
engage	in	collaborative	activities	that	can	‘plug	and	play’	in	each	others'	
organization	architectures	and	processes.	
	 By	contrast,	architectural	specificity	refers	to	the	property	of	architectures	
that	have	been	strategically	partitioned	into	kinds	of	components	that	are	
functionally	different	from	those	used	in	other	firms'	architectures	and/or	that	have	
adopted	interface	specifications	for	their	components	that	are	not	compatible	with	
the	interface	specifications	used	in	other	firms'	architectures.	Firms	that	have	
adopted	product	architectures	with	high	levels	of	specificity	will	to	that	extent	be	
committed	to	using	components	that	cannot	‘plug	and	play’	in	other	firms'	product	
architectures	and	that	cannot	readily	be	sourced	from	other	firms,	owing	to	their	
functional	and/or	interface	differences	(Sanchez,	2008;	MacDuffie,	2013).	For	the	
same	reason,	firms	that	have	adopted	organization	architectures	with	high	levels	of	
specificity	will	to	that	extent	not	be	readily	able	to	provide	or	receive	development,	
production,	and	service	activities	to	or	from	other	firms	or	to	engage	in	
collaborative	activities,	because	their	organization	functions	are	not	aligned	with	
those	used	in	other	firms'	organization	architectures	and	processes.3	
																																																								
3	Baldwin	(2008)	characterizes	the	lack	of	such	interactions	between	firms	with	
architectures	that	are	highly	specific	as	creating	‘transaction‐free	zones.’	Note	also	the	
architectural	characteristics	we	describe	here	are	sometimes	referred	to	by	various	other	
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Industry	standard	architectures	and	firm‐specific	architectures	
The	architectural	choices	that	firms	make	will	result	in	individual	firms	adopting	
what	we	henceforward	refer	to	as	an	industry	standard	architecture	or	a	firm‐specific	
architecture.	As	we	suggest	below,	the	two	kinds	of	architectures	are	likely	to	differ	
significantly	in	their	system	properties	and	in	the	way	in	which	modularity	is	likely	
to	be	used.		
	
Industry	standard	architectures	(ISAs)	
When	at	least	two	firms	in	an	industry	adopt	product	and	organization	architectures	
that	have	significant	architectural	commonality	and	are	therefore	technically	able	to	
engage	in	efficient	exchanges	of	product	components	and	organization	activities,	
they	create	what	we	refer	to	as	an	industry	standard	architecture	(ISA).4		Given	this	
conceptualization,	a	given	industry	may	include	multiple	ISAs	competing	to	provide	
similar	kinds	of	(architecturally	distinct)	products	to	the	same	customers	or	to	
different	subgroups	of	customers.	
	 In	our	framework,	an	ISA	may	be	an	open	system	in	which	any	interested	
firms	may	participate,	or	a	closed	system	controlled	by	a	single	firm	or	group	of	firms	
that	decide	which	firms	may	participate	in	the	ISA.5	
																																																																																																																																																																					
terms	in	the	literature.	Architectures	with	high	levels	of	commonality,	for	example,	have	
been	referred	to	as	platforms	(e.g.,	West,	2003;	Boudreau,	2010),	while	architectures	with	
high	levels	of	specificity	have	been	referred	to	as	architectures	with	‘unique	
complementarities’	(Argyres	and	Zinger,	2012).	
4	An	ISA	is	therefore	likely	to	incorporate	many	of	the	ingredients	of	an	‘industry		recipe’	
(Spender,	1989)	or	‘template’	(Jacobides,	Knudsen,	and	Augier,	2006)	for	competing	in	an	
industry.			
5	There	are	both	technical	and	legal	aspects	to	open‐system	and	closed‐system	ISAs	in	this	
context.	To	participate	in	either	an	open‐system	or	closed‐system	ISA,	firms	must	have	an	
adequate	technical	understanding	of	the	way	an	architecture	is	partitioned	into	functional	
components	and	of	the	interfaces	that	enable	the	components	to	function	together	as	a	
system.	The	legal	aspect	of	open‐system	or	closed‐system	ISAs	concerns	intellectual	
property	rights	(IPRs)	in	designs	of	components	and	interfaces.	In	an	open‐system	ISA,	
component	designs	and	interfaces	are	either	not	protected	by	IPRs	or	can	be	licensed	on	
acceptable	terms	from	the	holder	of	relevant	IPRs.	In	a	closed‐system	ISA,	the	firm	or	firms	
controlling	the	ISA	may	use	secrecy	(especially	with	respect	to	interface	specifications)	or	
explicit	IPRs	to	control	partiipation	in	the	ISA,	typically	by	licensing	other	firms	to	use	key	
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	 When	either	an	open‐system	or	closed‐system	ISA	is	also	modular,	firms	that	
participate	in	the	ISA	may	use	the	modularity	property	of	the	architecture	as	a	
‘platform’	for	exchanging	a	range	of	architecturally	compatible	product	component	
variations	and	organizational	activities	that	can	readily	‘plug	and	play’	in	the	ISA	
they	share.	Exchanges	of	components	and	activities	among	firms	using	a	modular	
ISA	may	enable	them	to	configure	product	variations	and	rapidly	upgrade	products	
as	new	and	higher‐performing	component	variations	are	developed	and	exchanged	
within	the	ISA	(Garud	and	Kumaraswamy,	1995;	Sanchez	1995,	2008;	Sanderson	
and	Uzumeri,	1996).	Use	of	standard	‘common	components’	by	firms	using	the	ISA	
may	also	lead	to	economies	of	scale	that	lower	component	costs	(Sanchez,	2008).	
	 An	ISA	may	be	created	by	design—through	explicit	collaborations	by	firms—
or	may	emerge	in	an	industry	as	some	firms	independently	converge	towards	a	
common	architecture	that	they	perceive	to	be	the	most	advantageous	to	adopt	in	
their	industry	(Baldwin	and	Clark,	1997;	Jacobides,	Knudsen,	and	Augier,	2006;	
Boisot	and	Sanchez,	2010).6		
	 	
Firm‐specific	architectures	(FSAs)	
When	a	firm	adopts	an	architecture	with	substantial	architectural	specificity,	it	
essentially	commits	to	using	an	architecture	that	does	not	enable	ready	exchanges	
of	product	components	and	organization	activities	with	other	firms.	We	refer	to	
																																																																																																																																																																					
component	designs	or	interfaces	used	in	the	ISA.	To	meet	our	definition	of	an	ISA,	a	closed‐	
system	ISA	must	allow	the	participation	of	at	least	two	firms.	In	practice,	firms	that	control	
an	ISA	may	solicit	the	participation	of	many	firms	in	order	to	gain	the	benefits	of	an	open‐
system	ISA	while	maintaining	control	over	access	to	the	ISA	(Sanchez	and	Collins,	2001).	
6	In	the	latter	case,	the	emergence	of	an	ISA	would	be	analogous	to	Abernathy	and	Clark's	
(1985)	notion	of	the	emergence	of	a	dominant	design	in	an	industry.	However,	Abernathy	
and	Clark's	dominant	design	concept	primarily	refers	to	a	prevalent	arrangement	of	
components	in	a	product	design	(which	corresponds	to	our	concept	of	the	strategic	
partitioning	of	a	design),	while	in	our	architectural	framework	the	emergence	of	an	ISA	
would	also	involve	the	emergence	of	widely	used	interfaces	between	components.	Garud	and	
Kumaraswamy	(1995)	suggest	that	positive	network	externalities	motivate	such	emergent	
processes	in	industries.	See	Sanchez	and	Heene	(2004,	p.	139–143)	for	an	elaboration	of	the	
incentives	typically	driving	the	emergence	of	standard	types	of	components	(i.e.,	common	
approaches	to	strategic	partitioning)	and	the	emergence	of	standard	interface	specifications	
in	the	evolution	of	an	industry.	
	
Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	‐	26	August	2013	
	 12
such	a	‘stand	alone’	architecture	as	a	firm‐specific	architecture	(FSA).		An	FSA	is	
therefore	likely	to	be	a	closed‐system	architecture	controlled	by	a	single	firm	for	its	
exclusive	commercial	use	in	order	to	appropriate	any	rents	to	be	derived	from	use	
of	the	FSA.	
	 A	firm	may	nevertheless	choose	to	make	its	closed‐system	FSA	modular	in	
order	to	obtain	the	benefits	of	configuring	greater	product	variety,	more	rapid	
upgrading	of	components,	or	lower	costs	for	common	components	used	across	
product	variations	(Sanchez,	1995,	2008;	Worren,	Moore,	and	Cardona,	2002;	Kotha	
and	Srikanth,	2013).	It	may	then	undertake	to	develop	component	variations	for	its	
FSA	exclusively	through	its	own	internal	capabilities,	or	it	may	seek	to	subcontract	
with	other	firms	for	development,	production,	or	support	services.	In	the	latter	
instance,	however,	a	firm	using	an	FSA	is	likely	to	face	significant	development	and	
production	set‐up	costs	from	subcontractors	because	of	the	idiosyncratic	nature	of	
the	functional	components	and	interfaces	used	in	its	FSA.	It	may	also	face	significant	
challenges	and	costs	in	trying	to	coordinate	development	and	other	activities	with	
organizations	whose	strategic	partitioning	of	these	activities	differs	from	its	own.		
	
	
INFLUENCE	OF	ARCHITECTURES	ON	INTER‐FIRM	COMPETITION	AND	
COOPERATION	
	
Traditional	views	of	strategic	interactions	among	firms	in	an	industry	tend	to	focus	
on	competitive	interactions	between	firms	in	product	markets.		The	architectural	
perspective	that	we	develop	here,	however,	suggests	that	firms	may	be	engaged	in	a	
more	fundamental	form	of	strategizing	about	their	interactions	with	other	firms—a	
process	that	in	the	first	instance	involves	firms'	choices	of	product	and	organization	
architectures	that	subsequently	lead	to	the	formation	of	alternative	industry	
systems	for	creating	and	providing	products	to	a	market.		
	 Within	this	perspective,	an	individual	firm's	most	basic	strategic	choices	are	
(i)	whether	to	compete	with	a	stand‐alone,	closed‐system	FSA	or	with	an	open‐
system	ISA	that	can	be	used	by	other	firms,	and	(ii)	whether	its	chosen	FSA	or	ISA	
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should	be	modular	or	non‐modular.	As	we	explain	in	this	section,	the	architectural	
choices	that	a	firm	makes	in	these	two	regards	will	largely	determine	the	extent	to	
which	its	various	interactions	with	other	firms	in	its	industry	are	likely	to	be	
competitive	or	cooperative.		
	 The	open‐system	versus	closed‐system	and	modular	versus	non‐modular	
properties	of	firm	architectures	suggest	that	a	firm's	architectural	choices	are	likely	
to	commit	it	to	one	of	four	distinct	kinds	of	competitive	and	cooperative	inter‐firm	
interactions	in	its	industry.7	These	four	types	of	architecture‐influenced	inter‐firm	
interactions	are	summarized	in	Figure	3.		
	
<<<<<<		Insert	FIGURE	3	Here		>>>>>>	
	
	 Adopting	a	closed‐system	FSA	implies	that	the	firm	controlling	and	using	the	
FSA	will	engage	in	largely	competitive	interactions	with	other	firms	in	its	industry,	
relying	on	its	own	internal	capabilities	and	on	licensed	subcontracting	to	create	
components	and	support	activities	for	its	products.	Modularity	may	also	be	used	in	
the	FSA	if	the	controlling	firm	intends	to	develop	component	variations	in	order	to	
configure	product	variations	and	upgrade	product	performance.	If	the	firm	does	not	
intend	to	introduce	many	product	variations	or	frequent	upgrades,	it	may	choose	to	
use	a	non‐modular	FSA.	
	 Adopting	an	open‐system	ISA,	however,	makes	it	easier	and	more	efficient	
for	a	firm	to	engage	in	cooperative	exchanges	of	components	and	activities	with	
other	firms	using	the	same	ISA.	In	particular,	a	modular	ISA	can	serve	as	a	‘platform’	
for	a	network	of	participating	firms	to	actively	develop	and	exchange	component	
variations	in	order	to	increase	product	variety	and	to	upgrade	product	performance,	
as	well	as	lower	product	costs	through	use	of	common	components.	When	the	need	
for	product	variety	and	upgrading	is	low,	use	of	a	non‐modular	ISA	may	
																																																								
7	In	our	representation	of	‘upstream’	interactions	between	firms	prior	to	product	market	
competition,	we	adopt	a	Porterian	view	of	contracting	for	components	or	services	by	a	firm	
controlling	an	FSA	and	characterize	such	interactions	as	essentially	competitive	interactions	
between	buyer	and	supplier	(Porter,	1980).	
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nevertheless	enable	firms	to	exchange	industry	standard	components	(e.g.,	
replacement	parts)	and	services	among	participating	firms.		
In	effect,	the	architectural	perspective	we	develop	here	suggests	that	a	firm's	
strategic	choice	of	architecture	is	not	just	a	choice	between	alternative	product	
architectures	for	attracting	customers	to	its	final	products.	It	is	also	a	choice	
between	alternative	architecture‐enabled	industry	systems	for	engaging	suppliers,	
development	partners,	and	other	industry	participants	in	exchanges	of	components	
and	activities	in	composing	the	firm's	value‐creation	activities	within	its	industry	
(Jacobides,	2005;	Fujimoto,	2007;	Langlois	and	Gazarelli,	2008;	Sanchez,	2008).	
In	the	following	sections,	we	extend	this	architectural	perspective	on	firms'	
strategic	organizing	decisions	by	suggesting	how	a	firm's	choice	of	ISA	versus	FSA	is	
likely	to	impact	its	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	in	its	interactions	with	other	
firms.	We	also	suggest	how	heterogeneous	capabilities	across	firms	in	an	industry	
create	different	potentials	for	firms	to	capture	gains	from	specialization	versus	gains	
from	trade	through	use	of	either	an	ISA	or	an	FSA.	We	then	combine	our	transaction	
costs	and	capabilities	perspectives	on	inter‐firm	interactions	to	elaborate	some	
further	strategic	concerns	that	are	likely	to	drive	a	firm's	choice	of	product	and	
organization	architecture.	We	also	draw	on	these	two	perspectives	to	further	
elaborate	the	strategic	influences	that	firms'	collective	architectural	choices	are	
likely	to	have	on	the	evolution	of	product	markets	and	industries,	as	suggested	by	
our	general	model	in	Figure	2.	
	
	
ARCHITECTURES	AND	TRANSACTION	COSTS	
We	now	consider	some	fundamental	ways	in	which	use	of	an	ISA	versus	an	FSA	can	
affect	the	transaction	costs	a	firm	is	likely	to	face	in	undertaking	exchanges	of	
components	and	activities	with	other	firms	in	its	industry.	We	consider	the	impacts	
of	a	firm's	use	of	an	ISA	versus	an	FSA	on	(i)	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	
generally,	and	(ii)	on	asset	specificity,	incomplete	contracting,	opportunism,	and	
small	numbers	bargaining	in	particular.	
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Ex	ante	and	ex	post	transactions	costs	
Broadly	construed,	transaction	cost	economics	frames	‘the	problem	of	economic	
organization	as	a	problem	of	contracting’	in	which	transaction	costs	represent	all	
the	costs	associated	with	contracting	–	i.e.,	with	market	transactions—in	organizing	
economic	activity	(Williamson	1985:	19).	Transaction	cost	economics	(TCE)	
generally	assumes	that	markets	offer	the	most	efficient	approach	to	organizing	
economic	activity,	and	that	decisions	to	internalize	and	hierarchically	coordinate	an	
activity	will	be	made	only	when	the	transaction	costs	associated	with	contracting	for	
a	given	activity	exceed	the	full	costs	of	internally	performing	the	activity.8		
	 TCE	recognizes	both	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	associated	with	
contracting.	In	classical	TCE,	ex	ante	transaction	costs	represent	the	‘costs	of	
drafting,	negotiating,	and	safeguarding	an	agreement’	(Williamson	1985:	20).	Ex	
post	costs	include	(i)	the	costs	of	‘maladaption…when	transactions	drift	out	of	
alignment,’	(ii)	‘haggling	costs	incurred	if	bilateral	efforts	are	made	to	correct	ex	post	
misalignments,’	(iii)	‘the	set‐up	and	running	costs	associated	with	the	governance	
structures	to	which	disputes	are	referred,’	and	(iv)	‘the	bonding	costs	of	effecting	
secure	commitments’	(Williamson	1985:	21).		
	 Both	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	are	influenced	by	the	three	‘critical	
dimensions’	of	economic	transactions:	uncertainty,	frequency,	and	asset	specificity	
(Williamson,	1979:	239;	Langlois,	2006:	1390;	Carter	and	Hodgson,	2006;	Macher	
and	Richman,	2008).	Uncertainty	increases	the	ex	ante	costs	of	trying	to	write	
adequate	contracts	and	results	in	some	degree	of	‘incompleteness’	in	a	contract	
(Hart,	1995;	Baldwin,	2008).	Any	resulting	contractual	incompleteness	may	lead	to	
ex	post	costs	arising	from	unforeseen	contingencies	that	may	require	further	
negotiations	or	may	incur	‘hold	up’	costs	if	transaction	partners	engage	in	
opportunistic	behavior.	The	frequency	of	transactions	acts	as	a	multiplier	on	the	ex	
																																																								
8		As	Williamson	(1985:	87)	notes,	‘only	as	market‐mediated	contracts	break	down	are	
transactions….removed	from	markets	and	organized	internally.	The	presumption	that	‘in	
the	beginning	there	were	markets’	informs	this	perspective.’	In	classical	TCE	the	‘full	costs	
of	internally	performing	an	activity’	referred	to	above	include	the	costs	of	production	and	
the	opportunity	costs	inherent	in	the	(presumed)	loss	of	efficiency	when	an	activity	is	
organized	internally	instead	of	through	markets.		
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post	transactions	costs	associated	with	each	contract	a	firm	makes.	Asset	specificity	
creates	a	risk	that	any	specific‐use	assets	on	which	a	contracting	firm's	processes	
depend	may	not	be	available	(or	available	on	pre‐agreed	terms)	when	needed	by	the	
firm.	
	
Influence	of	architectures	on	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	
How	firms'	architectural	choices	affect	their	ex	ante	versus	ex	post	transactions	costs	
is	a	rather	recent	concern	in	transaction	cost	economics	(Langlois,	2006;	Santos	
Abrunhosa,	and	Costa	2006;	Baldwin,	2008).	In	analyzing	the	effects	of	modularity	
on	transactions	costs,	Baldwin	(2008:156)	suggests	that	the	concepts	of	ex	ante	and	
ex	post	transactions	costs	can	be	further	elaborated	by	distinguishing	certain	kinds	
of	architecture‐related	‘mundane	transactions	costs’	that	can	be	incurred	ex	ante	in	
order	to	reduce	ex	post	‘opportunistic	transactions	costs.’	
	 Baldwin	(2008:	156)	specifically	characterizes	the	costs	of	creating	modular	
architectures	as	an	ex	ante	mundane	transaction	cost	that	reduces	ex	post	
opportunistic	transaction	costs	involved	in	developing	and	producing	products.	Ex	
post	transaction	costs	can	be	reduced,	for	example,	by	ex	ante	defining	specific	kinds	
of	modular	components	to	be	transacted	for	and	specific	measures	for	assessing	
component	quality	and	performance,	thereby	enabling	use	of	the	market	price	
mechanism	in	ex	post	transactions	for	components.	Langlois	(2006)	further	
characterizes	the	creation	of	legal,	technical,	and	organizational	standards	as	
mundane	transaction	costs	that	help	to	reduce	ex	post	opportunistic	transaction	
costs.	For	example,	ex	post	transaction	costs	can	be	reduced	when	firms	can	use	
standard	technical	specifications,	standard	contracts,	and	standard	contracting	and	
monitoring	procedures	for	inter‐firm	exchanges	within	a	modular	ISA	regime.	
	 We	extend	this	line	of	reasoning	to	suggest	that	a	fundamental	dimension	of	
the	strategic	organizing	task	of	strategic	managers	is	considering	which	kinds	of	
architectures	offer	their	firm	ex	post	transaction	costs	that	are	attractive	relative	to	
the	ex	ante	transaction	costs	the	firm	would	have	to	incur	in	order	to	create	and	use	
a	given	architecture.		
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	 Choosing	an	FSA,	on	the	one	hand,	may	give	a	firm	strategic	benefits	resulting	
from	exclusive	control	and	use	of	its	architecture,	for	example,	but	it	is	also	a	
strategic	decision	to	incur	full	development	costs	for	a	firm‐specific	architecture,	
resulting	in	potentially	high	ex	ante	mundane	transactions	costs	and	a	‘normal’	level	
of	ex	post	opportunism	transaction	costs	(Baldwin	2008).9	If	a	firm	also	invests	in	
the	ex	ante	transaction	costs	of	creating	a	well‐defined	modular	FSA,	which	may	
include	proprietary	modular	component	designs	and	interface	specifications	
protected	by	IPRs,	it	may	realize	lower	ex	post	development	costs	in	creating	
product	variations	and	upgrades.10	
	 Choosing	an	open‐system	ISA	may	take	one	of	two	forms:	(i)	a	firm	may	
decide	to	adopt	and	participate	in	an	emergent	or	existing	ISA;	(ii)	or	a	firm	may	
take	the	lead	in	creating	an	architecture	that	it	hopes	will	attract	the	collaboration	of	
other	firms	interested	in	developing	and	using	an	ISA.	To	the	extent	that	firms	share	
the	costs	of	developing	a	new	ISA	and	compatible	components,	both	adopting	and	
creating	an	ISA	are	likely	to	result	in	reduced	ex	ante	transaction	costs	(of	
development)	to	individual	firms	participating	in	the	ISA	compared	to	the	ex	ante	
transaction	costs	incurred	by	a	single	firm	in	developing	its	own	FSA.11		
	 Further,	recalling	Langlois'	(2006)	and	Baldwin's	(2008)	arguments	that	ex	
ante	costs	of	creating	modular	architectures	may	significantly	reduce	several	kinds	
of	ex	post	transaction	costs,	and	recalling	our	argument	that	use	of	a	modular	ISA	
may	enable	firms	to	engage	in	cooperative	interactions	that	lower	both	the	costs	of	
developing	the	ISA	and	the	costs	of	components	used	in	the	ISA,	we	suggest	that	
participation	in	a	modular	ISA	may	reduce	both	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	
for	firms	in	an	industry.	To	the	extent	that	modular	ISAs	enable	significant	
																																																								
9	For	example,	a	firm	creating	an	FSA	may	incur	significant	ex	ante	transaction	costs	to	
establish	IPRs	that	can	prevent	other	firms	from	using	its	FSA	ex	post,	but	it	would	still	have	
to	incur	‘normal’	ex	post	transactions	costs	to	defend	its	IPRs	and	its	FSA.		
10	This	expectation	corresponds	to	MacDuffie's	(2013)	observation	that	intensive	
coordination	and	communication	activities	are	likely	to	precede	the	emergence	of	modular	
architectures	and	standardized	interfaces—which	we	suggest	would	likely	be	the	case	in	
both	modular	FSA	and	modular	ISA	contexts.	
11	We	also	note	that	firms	deciding	to	adopt	an	existing	ISA	developed	by	another	firm	may	
be	able	to	substitute	ex	post	variable	costs	of	licensing	IPRs	from	the	developing	firm	for	ex	
ante	sunk	costs	of	developing	its	own	FSA.	
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reductions	of	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	compared	to	use	of	FSAs	or	non‐
modular	ISAs,	we	would	expect	that	any	ISAs	that	emerge	in	an	industry	are	likely	to	
be	modular,	and	that	adoption	of	modular	ISAs	will	be	increasingly	common	in	
industries	where	significant	reductions	of	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	are	
obtainable,	ceteris	paribus	(Sanchez,	2003;	Baldwin,	2008).12		
	 	 	
Influence	of	architectures	on	asset	specificity,	incomplete	contracting,	
opportunism,	and	small	numbers	bargaining	
A	firm's	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transactions	costs	may	depend	substantially	on	the	
kinds	of	assets	that	must	be	put	in	place	in	order	for	a	firm	to	develop	and	use	an	
architecture	(Hoetker,	2006;	Fixson	and	Park,	2008).	In	this	regard,	Williamson	
(1985:	30‐32)	suggests	that	the	most	critical	challenges	in	economic	organizing	
arise	‘when	bounded	rationality,	opportunism,	and	asset	specificity	are	joined.’	
	 Bounded	rationality	imposes	limits	on	the	abilities	of	contracting	parties	to	
imagine	and	address	all	possible	contingencies	in	a	contract	(Simon	1954).	In	such	
cases,	the	bounded	rationality	of	transacting	parties	(coupled	with	irreducible	
uncertainties	about	future	contingencies)	results	in	contracts	for	ordering	market	
transactions	that	are	incomplete	to	some	extent,	and	sometimes	to	a	very	large	
extent	(Arrow	1974;	Hart	1995).		
	 Traditional	TCE	is	especially	concerned	when	incomplete	contracts	for	
ordering	transactions	that	depend	on	specific‐use	assets	give	rise	to	opportunities	
for	a	transacting	party	to	engage	in	ex	post	opportunistic	behavior	or	‘hold	up.’13	
When	a	firm	contracts	for	use	of	a	transacting	party's	specific‐use	assets,	and	those	
assets	cannot	easily	be	replaced	because	there	will	be	few	or	no	alternative	
transactions	partners	in	the	marketplace	(‘small	numbers	bargaining’),	an	
																																																								
12	This	approach	to	evaluating	transaction	costs	associated	with	architectures	in	strategic	
organizing	is	consistent	with	Williamson’s	(1985:	21)	observation	that	ex	ante	and	ex	post	
contracting	costs	are	interdependent	and	‘must	be	addressed	simultaneously	rather	than	
sequentially.’	
	
13	Williamson	(1985:30)	succinctly	characterizes	opportunism	as	‘self‐interest	seeking	with	
guile.’	
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opportunistic	transaction	partner	may	impose	substantial	ex	post	transactions	costs	
on	its	hapless	transaction	partner.		
	 The	use	of	an	ISA	and	especially	a	modular	ISA	may	significantly	change	this	
set	of	convergent	factors	that	create	concerns	about	ex‐post	opportunism	arising	
from	specific‐use	assets.	While	an	ISA	may	require	the	use	of	assets	that	are	specific	
to	a	given	type	of	transaction	within	an	architecture—e.g.,	development	or	
production	of	a	given	type	of	component	or	activity	that	is	specific	to	a	given	ISA—
the	threat	of	ex	post	opportunism	in	contracting	with	a	supplier	for	use	of	its	asset	
may	be	reduced	to	the	extent	that	other	firms	participating	in	the	ISA	have	a	similar	
kind	of	specific‐use	asset.	In	effect,	if	an	ISA	attracts	a	significant	number	of	firms	as	
developers	and	producers	of	components	and	activities	compatible	with	the	ISA,	a	
market	may	form	around	the	ISA	that	mitigates	the	problem	of	small	numbers	
bargaining,	even	when	development	and	use	of	an	ISA	involves	specific‐use	assets.	
The	formation	of	a	market	for	components	and	activities	within	an	ISA	regime	may	
therefore	eliminate	or	substantially	reduce	the	ex	post	costs	of	opportunism	
associated	with	uncertainties	about	a	firm's	ability	to	obtain	the	services	of	a	
current	supplier's	specific‐use	assets	in	the	future.	
	
	
GAINS	FROM	SPECIALIZATION	AND	GAINS	FROM	TRADE		
	
To	complement	our	transaction	costs	perspective	on	architectural	choice,	we	now	
consider	how	a	firm's	choice	of	architecture	may	also	affect	its	ability	to	capture	
value	through	transactions	undertaken	within	an	architectural	regime	(Zajac	and	
Olsen	1993).		We	adopt	a	capabilities	perspective	to	suggest	how	a	firm's	choice	of	
FSA	or	ISA	will	affect	its	ability	to	capture	gains	from	specialization	versus	gains	
from	trade	(Jacobides,	2005;	Boudreau,	2010).		
	 	
Gains	from	specialization	and	trade	
Economic	theory	has	long	recognized	that	firms	that	specialize	in	a	particular	
productive	activity	may	‘deepen	their	expertise’	in	ways	that	result	in	lower	costs	or	
better	quality,	thus	realizing	‘gains	from	specialization’	in	productive	processes	
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(Smith	1981).	When	at	least	some	firms	specialize	in	the	various	technologically	
separable	activities	that	constitute	an	overall	productive	process,	other	firms	may	
realize	‘gains	from	trade’	with	specialist	firms	by	obtaining	lower‐cost	and/or	
higher‐quality	components	that	enable	them	to	offer	more	successful	and	profitable	
final	products	(Stigler	and	Sherwin,	1985;	Madhok,	2002;	Jacobides,	2005).	The	
globally	dispersed	value	chains	in	which	many	firms	today	produce,	sell,	and	buy	
components	suggest	that	at	least	some	firms	do	simultaneously	seek	both	gains	
from	specialization	and	gains	from	trade	(McDermott,	Mudambi,	and	Parente,	
2013).		
	 Traditional	TCE	also	recognizes	the	possibility	of	obtaining	gains	from	both	
specialization	and	gains	from	trade.	Given	its	traditional	focus	on	costs	and	inter‐
firm	contracts,	classical	TCE	generally	represents	such	gains	as	resulting	in	lower	
costs	for	inputs	when	a	firm	sources	an	input	from	another	firm	in	the	context	of	
unilateral	trade	(i.e.,	conventional	buyer‐seller	supply	arrangements).	TCE	tends	to	
have	a	more	limited	view	of	possibilities	for	realizing	cost	savings,	quality	
improvements,	and	other	forms	of	mutual	gains	in	the	context	of	bilateral	exchanges	
between	firms	(Williamson	1985:	193‐195).	As	we	suggest	below,	the	potential	for	
capturing	gains	from	specialization	and	trade	through	bilateral	exchange	may	be	
significant,	but	is	likely	to	vary	considerably	depending	on	whether	a	firm	is	using	
an	FSA	or	an	ISA,	in	large	part	because	of	the	differences	in	appropriability	regimes	
usually	associated	with	the	two	kinds	of	architectures	(Teece,	1986).	
	
	
	
Gains	from	specialization	and	trade	in	an	FSA	context	
A	strategic	choice	to	adopt	an	FSA	is	likely	to	be	driven	by	a	firm's	belief	that	it	can	
best	succeed	by	using	its	own	specialized	capabilities	to	develop	and	produce	
products.	A	firm	that	adopts	an	FSA	is	therefore	likely	to	use	significant	vertical	
integration	of	activities	to	develop	and	supply	key	components	for	its	FSA	(Klein,	
Crawford,	and	Alchian,	1978),	though	the	firm	may	also	engage	in	subcontracting	for	
development	and	production	of	components	in	which	it	believes	it	does	not	have	an	
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advantage.	In	effect,	when	a	firm	chooses	to	create	and	use	an	FSA,	it	is	in	important	
respects	choosing	to	engage	in	traditional	forms	of	‘atomistic,’	stand‐alone,	
Porterian	competition	with	other	firms	in	its	industry	(Porter,	1980).	Value	capture	
must	then	be	sought	in	the	form	of	gains	from	specialization	that	are	realized	
through	sales	of	the	products	made	possible	by	its	specialized	capabilities.			
	
Gains	from	specialization	and	trade	in	an	ISA	context	
The	strategic	partitioning	of	an	ISA	into	well‐defined	and	technically	stable	types	of	
components	and	interfaces	offers	opportunities	for	firms	to	specialize	in	specific	
types	of	product	components	and	process	activities	used	within	the	ISA.	Because	a	
current	ISA	offers	a	relatively	defined	and	predictable	technical	environment	for	
developing	and	exchanging	ISA‐compatible	components	and	activities,	ISAs	often	
attract	the	participation	of	firms	whose	capabilities	give	them	comparative	
advantages	in	developing	and/or	producing	specific	kinds	of	components	used	in	an	
ISA	(Hunt	and	Morgan,	1995;	Galvin	and	Morkel,	2001;	Jacobides,	2005;	Sanchez,	
2008).	Both	component	specialists	and	assembler	firms	may	realize	gains	from	
specialization	and	trade	when	this	occurs.	
	 Component	specialists	participating	in	an	ISA	may	capture	gains	from	
specialization	in	the	form	of	profits	earned	by	selling	components	(i)	in	which	they	
have	cost	advantages	(relative	to	internalized	production	by	non‐specialist	firms)	
realized	by	consolidating	demand	for	their	type	of	ISA‐compatible	component	and	
achieving	scale	economies,	and/or	(ii)	in	which	they	use	their	deep	expertise	to	
develop	and	produce	high	quality	ISA	components	that	command	higher	prices	than	
components	offered	by	non‐specialist	firms.	Such	firms	may	also	seek	to	capture	
gains	from	their	specialization	by	collecting	royalties	on	components	licensed	for	
production	or	use	by	other	ISA	firms,	and/or	by	selling	their	own	versions	of	
products	that	incorporate	their	own	components	that	confer	cost	or	quality	
advantages.	
	 When	an	ISA	attracts	firms	that	are	specialists	in	various	product	and	
process	components,	assembler	firms	that	configure	products	from	ISA‐compatible	
components	sourced	from	specialist	firms	may	realize	significant	gains	from	trade	
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in	several	ways.	An	assembler	firm	may	realize	gains	from	trade	in	the	form	of	
lower‐cost	components	sourced	from	specialist	firms	that	have	consolidated	
demand	to	achieve	economies	of	scale	beyond	those	which	the	assembler	firm	could	
hope	to	achieve.	An	assembler	firm	that	sources	high	quality	components	from	
specialist	firms	may	also	improve	the	attractiveness	of	its	products,	thereby	
enabling	the	firm	to	realize	gains	from	trade	by	obtaining	higher	prices	for	superior	
products	(Zajac	and	Olsen,	1993).	In	addition,	when	an	assembler	firm	participates	
in	a	modular	ISA,	the	firm	may	realize	further	gains	from	trade	by	sourcing	a	range	
of	modular	component	variations	to	configure	a	broader	range	of	product	variations	
and	by	sourcing	leading‐edge	components	to	upgrade	the	performance	levels	of	its	
products.	Both	uses	of	components	sourced	from	specialist	firms	may	enhance	the	
market	appeal	of	its	products,	increase	the	prices	the	firm	can	obtain	for	its	
products,	and	thereby	realize	gains	from	trade	in	the	form	of	increased	profits	
(Sanchez,	1995;	Sanderson	and	Uzumeri,	1997).	
	 Both	component	specialist	and	assembler	firms	may	benefit	from	a	number	
of	important	architectural	externalities	created	by	ISAs	(Sanchez,	2008;	Boudreau,	
2010).14	On	the	supply	side,	the	well‐defined	functional	structure	and	interface	
specifications	of	an	ISA	reduce	the	technical	information	search	and	processing	
costs	for	firms	that	are	interested	in	entering	an	industry	and	need	to	learn	the	
technical	basis	for	products	in	the	industry.	ISAs	may	also	incorporate	technical	
standards	that	reduce	the	uncertainties	and	lower	the	costs	of	specifying,	designing,	
testing,	and	maintaining	products	in	an	industry.	ISAs	may	also	encourage	the	
establishment	of	an	infrastructure	of	firms	to	service	and	repair	products	
configured	within	an	ISA	and,	when	widely	used,	may	stimulate	the	supply	of	
engineers	and	technicians	who	can	design	and	service	ISA‐compatible	products	
(Sanchez,	2000;	Funk,	2008).		
	 On	the	demand	side,	ISAs	may	spawn	performance	standards	that	help	
customers	to	specify	desired	levels	of	quality	and	reliability	and	enable	market	
comparisons	of	alternative	ISA	products.	The	increased	scale	of	production	of	ISA‐
																																																								
14	Some	of	these	architectural	externalities	may	contribute	to	reduced	ex	ante	and	ex	post	
transaction	costs	in	ways	not	previously	suggested	by	Langlois	(2006)	and	Baldwin	(2008).	
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compatible	components	and	products	(compared	to	most	FSAs)	may	lower	initial	
product	costs,	replacement	parts	and	components,	and	maintenance	and	repair	
costs.	When	an	ISA	has	attracted	various	assemblers	who	compete	in	the	
marketplace	for	final	products	configured	within	the	ISA,	customers	may	also	avoid	
the	‘lock‐in’	that	use	of	products	based	on	an	individual	firm’s	FSA	would	entail	
(Arthur	1994).	All	of	these	ISA‐derived	or	ISA‐enabled	externalities	may	help	to	
increase	market	acceptance	of	products	leveraged	from	an	ISA	and	thereby	
contribute	to	market	formation	and	growth,	which	further	contributes	to	the	
realization	of	gains	from	specialization	and	trade	by	firms	using	the	ISA.		
	 The	use	of	an	ISA	by	a	number	of	firms	in	an	industry	often	gives	rise	to	
significant	levels	of	‘coopetition’	among	rivals	–	typically	in	the	form	of	cooperation	
in	upstream	supply	arrangements	for	development	and	supply	of	ISA‐compatible	
components	and	activities	among	firms	that	are	also	downstream	competitors	in	
final	products	configured	from	the	ISA	architecture	(Nalebuff	and	Brandenburger,	
1996;	Sanchez,	2008;	Gnyawali,	He,	and	Madhavan,	2006).	While	some	firms	may	
have	special	capabilities	that	are	relevant	only	to	specific	components,	other	firms	
(especially	large	firms)	may	have	both	special	capabilities	relevant	to	one	or	more	
components	and	general	capabilities	useful	to	a	producer	and	marketer	of	final	
products.	These	firms	may—and	often	do—decide	that	they	have	comparative	
advantages	in	developing	and	producing	specific	components	that	make	it	possible	
to	capture	gains	from	specialization	by	supplying	the	components	both	to	
themselves	and	to	other	firms—thereby	enabling	opportunities	for	dual‐
distribution	strategies	(Safizadeh,	Field,	and	Ritzman,	2008).15		
	
																																																								
15	For	example,	Philips,	Sony,	Matsushita,	and	other	major	consumer	electronics	firms	have	
business	units	that	sell	components	for	consumer	electronics	products	to	other	industry	
participants	as	well	as	to	their	own	final‐product	business	units.	This	form	of	coopetition	
has	become	increasingly	common	in	auomotive,	telecommunications,	financial	services,	and	
many	other	industries	(Sanchez,	2008).	
	
Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	‐	26	August	2013	
	 24
REVERSE	MIRRORING	HYPOTHESIS	
We	now	draw	on	our	foregoing	analyses	to	elaborate	the	essential	theoretical	
rationale	motivating	our	Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	(see	Figure	1),	which	we	now	
state	formally	as	follows:	
	
	 Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis:		
	 The	organizational	architectures	that	a	firm	believes	may	be	possible	and	
	 advantageous	to	adopt	in	an	industry	will	influence	the	firm	to	choose	a	
	 product	architecture	that	is	best	aligned	with	the	organization	architecture	the	
	 firm	believes	will	enable	it	to	capture	the	greatest	net	gains	from	specialization	
	 and	trade—inclusive	of	both	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transactions	costs.	
	
	 Most	fundamentally,	our	discussion	leading	up	to	the	RMH	has	suggested	that	
while	a	firm's	choice	of	product	architecture	clearly	determines	what	products	a	
firm	will	be	able	to	bring	to	market,	the	product	and	organization	architecture	it	
chooses	will	also	largely	determine	what	resources	and	processes	a	firm	will	be	able	
to	access	in	creating,	producing,	and	supporting	its	products.	Choosing	to	create	a	
stand‐alone	FSA,	for	example,	is	essentially	a	decision	to	rely	on	the	firm's	own	
capabilities	to	create	and	use	an	idiosyncratic	product	architecture	to	compete	
against	other	firms.	Choosing	to	create	an	ISA	in	which	other	firms	may	participate,	
on	the	other	hand,	is	a	decision	to	adopt	a	platform	for	cooperating	with	other	firms	
and	to	draw	on	their	resources	and	capabilities	in	bringing	the	firm's	products	to	
market.		
	 Because	the	resources	and	capabilities	a	firm	can	readily	access	through	its	
organization	architecture	may	substantially	influence	the	kind	of	products	a	firm	
can	contemplate	bringing	to	market,	we	suggest	that	a	firm's	selection	of	product	
architecture	and	organization	architectures	will	be	undertaken	in	a	joint	decision	
process.	Hence,	as	Figure	1	suggests,	the	influence	of	product	architectures	on	
organization	architectures	suggested	by	the	Mirroring	Hypothesis	needs	to	be	
complemented	by	a	reciprocating	influence	of	potential	organization	architectures	
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on	a	firm's	choice	of	product	architectures,	as	suggested	by	the	Reverse	Mirroring	
Hypothesis	(RMH).	In	effect,	the	RMH	implies	that	firms	may	face	significant	
incentives	to	choose	product	architectures	that	mirror	the	organization	architecture	
that	each	firm	believes	will	help	it	to	capture	the	greatest	value	in	the	form	of	gains	
from	specialization	and	gains	from	trade—after	taking	into	account	the	likely	ex	
ante	and	ex	post	transactions	costs	associated	with	each	choice	of	a	given	
combination	of	product	and	organization	architecture.	
	 We	now	draw	on	our	preceding	analyses	to	summarize	the	nature	of	these	
incentives.	The	kind	of	product	and	organization	architecture	a	firm	chooses—a	
choice	that	we	have	represented	as	essentially	between	a	stand‐alone	FSA	and	an	
ISA	in	which	other	firms	can	participate16—will	have	multiple	strategic	
consequences.	In	the	first	instance,	a	firm's	choice	of	an	FSA	or	ISA	will	determine	
the	extent	to	which	a	firm	must	provide	its	own	components	and	supporting	
activities,	one	the	one	hand,	or	is	able	to	access	and	use	components	and	activities	
that	may	be	provided	by	other	firms	and	perhaps	vice‐versa,	on	the	other.		
	 If	a	firm	believes	that	it	has	distinctive	capabilities	that	would	enable	it	to	
achieve	the	greatest	benefit	by	capturing	gains	from	specialization	by	bringing	
superior	products	to	market,	that	would	present	an	incentive	for	the	firm	to	choose	
a	stand‐alone	FSA.		On	the	other	hand,	if	a	firm	believes	it	can	achieve	greater	
benefit	by	capturing	gains	from	trade	by	using	components	and	activities	sourced	
from	other	(specialist)	firms,	and	perhaps	by	capturing	gains	from	specialization	by	
using	its	distinctive	capabilities	to	provide	other	ISA	firms	with	components	and	
activities,	there	will	be	incentives	for	the	firm	to	adopt	an	ISA—and	very	likely	a	
modular	ISA—in	order	to	engage	in	cooperative	exchanges	and	activities	with	other	
firms	in	the	ISA	regime.	This	mode	of	analysis	suggests	that	even	firms	with	
																																																								
16	We	note	that	both	FSAs	and	ISAs	as	we	have	defined	them	here	are	essentially	ideal	types.	
That	is	to	say,	no	FSA	is	likely	to	be	completely	sui	generis,	because	it	may	share	at	least	
some	basic	‘industry	standard’	components	that	are	used	by	other	firms.	Similarly,	any	
firm's	products	leveraged	from	an	ISA	are	likely	to	contain	at	least	some	components	that	
are	to	some	extent	unique	to	a	given	firm.	In	practice,	therefore,	FSAs	and	ISAs	will	differ	
practically	in	the	extent	to	which	the	‘core	components’	that	provide	the	major	functions	
and	features	in	a	given	product	type	are	unique	to	a	firm's	FSA	or	shared	by	other	firms	in	
an	ISA.	
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moderate	or	no	capabilities	in	component	development	and	production	may	be	able	
to	participate	profitably	in	an	industry	if	they	can	capture	gains	from	trade	by	
sourcing	components	and	activities	from	more	capable	firms	participating	in	an	ISA.	
These	possibilities	for	capturing	value	from	both	specialization	and	trade	stand	in	
contrast	to	the	traditional	model	of	the	atomistic,	go‐it‐alone	firm,	whose	strategy	is	
to	capture	value	through	specialization	by	using	its	capabilities	wholly	within	its	
own	FSA.	
	 By	transacting	for	bilateral	exchanges	of	components	and	activities	within	an	
ISA,	firms	may	also	benefit	from	several	forms	of	reduced	ex	ante	and	ex	post	
transaction	costs	(Williamson,	1985;	Langlois,	2006;	Baldwin,	2008).	Ex	ante	
transaction	costs	may	be	reduced	by	adopting	an	existing	ISA	or	by	sharing	costs	of	
defining	and	developing	a	new	architecture	and	components	among	ISA	
participants.	Ex	post	transaction	costs	may	be	reduced	when	standards	for	
components	and	activities	defined	by	an	ISA	lead	to	reduced	costs	for	both	
unilateral	and	bilateral	exchanges	among	participants	in	an	ISA	(Williamson	
1985:21).	In	effect,	while	choosing	an	FSA	may	present	a	firm	with	an	opportunity	
to	incur	relatively	high	ex	ante	transactions	costs	in	order	to	enjoy	relatively	low	ex	
post	transactions	costs,	we	have	suggested	that	a	strategic	decision	to	use	an	ISA	
may	offer	firms	a	relatively	low	transaction‐cost	environment—both	ex	ante	and	ex	
post.		
	 The	joint	decision	process	that	we	suggested	in	Figure	1	can	now	be	
elaborated	as	essentially	a	process	of	weighing	the	relative	advantages	of	adopting	
an	FSA	versus	an	ISA.	Figure	4	summarizes	the	considerations	a	firm	may	recognize	
and	address	in	its	decision	process	for	choosing	an	FSA	or	ISA.	The	decision	process	
starts	with	a	firm's	evaluation	of	(i)	the	adequacy	of	its	own	capabilities	to	create	a	
viable	FSA,	and	(ii)	whether	creating	an	FSA	offers	the	best	prospect	for	capturing	
value	from	the	firm's	capabilities.	These	evaluations	must	then	be	compared	with	
the	firm's	assessment	of	(i)	the	possibilities	for	joining	an	emergent	or	existing	ISA	
or	creating	a	new	ISA,	and	(ii)	the	extent	to	which	those	possibilities	offer	attractive	
opportunities	to	capture	value	relative	to	creating	an	FSA.	In	both	cases,	we	assume	
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that	a	firm's	evaluations	of	its	potential	for	capturing	value	consider	both	ex	ante	
and	ex	post	transactions	costs	attendant	to	each	choice	of	architecture.		
	
<<<<<<		Insert	FIGURE	4	Here		>>>>>>	
	
	 Other	considerations	may	of	course	have	strategic	importance	in	various	
contexts,	but	we	suggest	that	the	implications	of	a	firm's	architecture	choices	that	
we	have	summarized	in	Figure	4	form	the	core	of	the	strategic	concerns	that	must	
be	addressed	by	a	firm's	managers	in	jointly	deciding	the	product	and	organization	
architecture	the	firm	will	use.		
	
	
HOW	FIRM	ARCHITECTURES	MEDIATE	PRODUCT	MARKET	AND	INDUSTRY	
EVOLUTION	
	
We	now	draw	on	our	preceding	discussion	to	summarize	the	role	that	the	joint	
architecture	decision	process	represented	by	the	Mirroring	Hypothesis	and	the	
Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	plays	in	our	general	model	linking	product	market	
evolution,	firms'	architecture	choices,	and	industry	evolution.	
	 As	suggested	in	Figure	2,	we	propose	that	the	collective	architectural	choices	
made	by	firms	in	an	industry	mediate	between	product	market	evolution	
(represented	by	firms'	entrepreneurial	responses	to	emerging	market	
opportunities)	and	industry	evolution	(represented	by	changes	in	the	architectures	
used	in	an	industry	and	associated	changes	in	competitive	and	cooperative	inter‐
firm	dynamics).	
	 On	the	product	market	side,	market	opportunities	arise	from	changes	in	
customer	preferences	for	various	kinds	of	products.	These	changes	may	be	driven	
by	broad	changes	in	the	economy,	society,	values,	and	other	macro‐environmental	
factors	(Kotler,	1994;	Narver	and	Slater,	1990).	Such	changes	in	market	preferences	
present	firms	with	new	opportunities	to	undertake	entrepreneurial	action	to	create	
new	and	improved	products.		
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	 In	this	context	it	is	important	to	note	the	implications	for	market	evolution	of	
Say's	Law	that	‘supply	creates	its	own	demand’	(Say,	1803).	In	effect,	firms	may	not	
only	react	to	changes	in	their	environments,	but	may	also	seek	to	actively	‘shape	
rapidly	changing	business	environments’	by	creating	new	kinds	of	products	and	
associated	market	processes	(Teece,	2012:	1395;	Pitelis	and	Teece,	2009).	Thus,	
while	much	product	market	evolution	is	likely	to	invite	incremental	improvements	
within	established	product	concepts	and	architectures	(Worren,	Moore,	and	
Cardona,	2002),	from	time	to	time	market	evolution	will	create	opportunities	for	
firms	to	create	new	kinds	of	architectures	for	offering	new	kinds	of	products	to	the	
market	(Kotler,	1997;	Sanchez,	1995,	2008).		
	 Thus,	the	architectures	that	firms	choose	may	both	drive	and	be	driven	by	
changes	in	markets.	A	market's	evolving	interest	in	new	and	improved	products	and		
firms'	choices	of	architectures	to	serve	those	interests	are	therefore	systemically	
interrelated	and	can	be	understood	as	co‐evolving	together.		
	 On	the	industry	side,	we	have	suggested	how	firms'	choices	of	architectures—
which	we	have	represented	as	most	fundamentally	a	decision	to	use	an	FSA	or	an	
ISA—determine	not	just	the	kinds	of	architectures	used	in	an	industry,	but	also	the	
ways	in	which	and	the	extent	to	which	firms	will	have	opportunities	to	capture	gains	
from	specialization	and/or	gains	from	trade	in	the	industry.		The	potential	for	firms	
to	capture	gains	from	specialization	and	trade	that	are	enabled	by	their	respective	
architectural	choices	in	turn	drive	the	dynamics	of	inter‐firm	interactions	in	an	
industry	and	largely	determine	the	extent	to	which	those	dynamics	will	be	
competitive	or	cooperative.	In	effect,	we	have	suggested	that	industry	structures	
may	also	be	understood	as	consisting	of	alternative	architecture‐enabled	systems	for	
capturing	gains	from	specialization	and	trade.	
	 Some	of	these	architecture‐enabled	systems	used	in	a	given	industry	context	
may	be	closed‐system	FSAs	through	which	individual	firms	compete,	and	some	may	
be	open‐system	ISAs	in	which	potentially	many	firms	both	cooperate	and	compete.	
In	choosing	which	kind	of	architecture‐enabled	system	to	use,	firms	may	consider	
both	the	existing	architectures	already	in	use	in	its	industry	and	the	potential	
architectures	that	it	may	be	possible	to	create	individually	or	with	other	firms.	In	
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making	architectural	choices,	firms	will	weigh	the	potential	gains	from	
specialization	and	trade	they	believe	they	can	capture	by	using	a	stand‐alone	FSA	
versus	using	an	existing	ISA	or	a	potential	ISA	that	could	be	created	through	
cooperative	interactions	with	other	firms.	Our	general	model	suggests	that	the	
evolution	of	the	architectures	firms	decide	to	use	will	be	driven	by	their	respective	
successes	and	failures	in	capturing	gains	from	specialization	and	trade	through	use	
of	alternative	architecture‐enabled	systems	for	responding	to	evolving	market	
opportunities.		
	 	
	
CONCLUSION	
We	conclude	by	suggesting	what	we	believe	are	some	of	the	most	important	
implications	of	the	architectural	perspective	and	analyses	we	develop	here	for	both	
strategy	theory	and	theories	of	economic	organizing.	
	
A	more	systemic	representation	of	product	and	organization	architectures	
The	Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	that	we	propose	here	addresses	a	relatively	
recent	but	important	question	in	the	ongoing	discussion	in	the	strategy	literature	
about	the	relationships	between	product	and	organization	architectures—i.e.,	the	
ways	in	which	‘organizations	[decide	to]	design	products’	(MacDuffie,	2013:	37–our	
amendment).	Although	substantial	support	has	been	found	for	Sanchez	and	
Mahoney's	(1996)	originally	posited	influence	of	product	architectures	on	firm's	
choices	of	organization	architectures	(the	Mirroring	Hypothesis),	our	Reverse	
Mirroring	Hypothesis	suggests	that	the	causal	relationship	between	product	and	
organization	architectures	is	likely	to	be	bi‐directional	and	thus	systemic	in	nature.	
Our	representation	of	product	and	organization	architectures	as	systemically	
interdependent	implies	that	firms	are	unlikely	simply	to	let	their	choice	of	product	
architecture	determine	their	organization	architecture.		
	 Rather,	we	suggest	that	firms'	strategic	organizing	decisions	will	involve	a	
joint	architectural	decision	process	in	which	each	firm	considers	the	strategic	
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implications	of	adopting	alternative	pairs	of	more	or	less	aligned	or	‘mirroring’	
product	and	organization	architectures.	In	this	decision	process,	firms	will	consider	
the	gains	from	trade	they	believe	they	can	capture	through	use	of	closed‐system,	
firm‐specific	product	and	organization	architectures	(FSAs)	to	compete	against	
other	firms.	They	will	then	compare	those	expected	gains	to	the	gains	from	
specialization	and	trade	they	believe	they	can	capture	through	use	of	open‐system	
product	and	organization	architectures	(ISAs)	that	support	both	cooperative	and	
competitive	interactions	with	other	firms.		
	 We	also	suggest	that	this	essentially	comparative	strategic	evaluation	and	
decision‐making	is	an	ongoing	process	driven	by	firms'	evolving	perceptions	of	the	
potential	to	capture	gains	by	using	alternative	pairings	of	aligned	product	and	
organization	architectures	to	respond	to	current	and	emerging	market	
opportunities.	Firms'	evolving	strategic	organizing	decisions	to	use	FSAs	or	ISAs	
collectively	drive	the	evolution	of	architectures	and	associated	cooperative	and	
competitive	dynamics	in	an	industry.	This	broader	systemic	perspective	on	firms'	
architectural	choices	leads	us	to	propose	our	general	model	in	which	firms'	
architectural	decisions	mediate	between	the	evolution	of	product	markets	and	the	
evolution	of	industries	and	their	competitive	and	cooperative	dynamics.		
	
	
	
A	new	perspective	on	industry	structures	
The	architectural	perspective	we	develop	here	supports	some	important	
elaborations	beyond	Porterian	concepts	of	inter‐firm	interactions	and	industry	
structures	(Porter	1980).		In	a	basic	sense,	the	technologies	and	resulting	
component	designs	and	interface	specifications	that	firms	choose	for	their	product	
architectures	determine	the	technical	systems	that	become	the	basis	for	their	
participation	in	an	industry.	When	significant	numbers	of	firms	begin	to	use	the	
component	designs	and	interface	specifications	of	an	ISA	to	exchange	components	
and	to	coordinate	their	activities,	the	interactions	between	firms	no	longer	resemble	
the	atomistic,	zero‐sum	competition	that	is	the	staple	of	the	classic	Porterian	view	of	
Reverse	Mirroring	Hypothesis	‐	26	August	2013	
	 31
firm	interactions.	Rather,	their	interactions	take	on	the	character	of	the	‘coopetitive,’	
positive‐sum	interactions	of	networks	or	ecosystems	of	firms	that	mutually	benefit	
from	using	common	technical	and	organizational	structures	(Sanchez	2008;	Galvin	
and	Morkel,	2001;	Fixson	and	Park,	2008;	MacDuffie,	2013).		
	 In	effect,	the	architectural	perspective	we	suggest	here	enables	us	to	see	
industries	through	a	new	lens	that	highlights	competing	architecture‐enabled	
systems	for	creating	and	capturing	value,	some	of	which	are	supported	by	stand‐
alone	firms	using	FSAs	and	some	of	which	are	supported	by	cooperating	firms	using	
common	ISAs.	We	suggest	that	this	perspective	enables	a	useful,	more	
contemporary	interpretation	of	industry	structures	as	being	defined	by	the	
architectures	that	enable	competing	systems	for	value	creation	and	capture	in	an	
industry,	rather	than	being	defined	simply	by	the	current	market	positions,	
customer	bases,	and	product	strategies	of	individual	firms.	
	
Integrating	micro	and	macro	views	of	economic	organizing	
We	also	suggest	that	our	architectural	perspective	has	significant	potential	 to	help	
achieve	 a	 useful	 integration	 of	 micro‐economic	 and	 macro‐economic	 theories	 of	
economic	organizing	 (Sanchez	 and	Mahoney,	 2013).	 The	 architectural	 perspective	
we	 advance	 here	 not	 only	 identifies	 important	 interrelationships	 of	 intra‐firm	
strategies,	 structures,	 and	processes,	 but	 also	 suggests	how	decisions	 about	 those	
factors	 made	 at	 the	 firm	 level	 interact	 with	 and	 shape	 industry‐level	 structures,	
processes,	 and	 competitive	 and	 cooperative	 dynamics.	 We	 suggest	 that	 the	
architectural	perspective	on	firms	and	industries	that	we	propose	here	may	lead	to	
better	 understanding	 of	 the	 systemic	 interrelationships	 between	 managerial	
decision‐making	about	economic	organizing	at	the	firm	level	and	the	emergence	of	
economic	structures,	processes,	and	dynamics	at	the	industry	level.		
	
ISAs	as	a	new	dominant	logic	
Our	discussion	has	also	suggested	that	a	firm	that	chooses	to	join	or	create	an	ISA	
may	reduce	both	ex	ante	and	ex	post	transaction	costs	and	thereby	improve	its	
ability	to	capture	value	through	transacting	with	firms	participating	in	an	ISA.	If	this	
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is	so,	then	unless	a	firm	has	a	clearly	superior	set	of	capabilities	that	enables	it	to	
capture	greater	gains	through	a	stand‐alone	FSA,	it	appears	that	ISA	regimes	may	
offer	a	broadly	advantageous	way	for	firms	to	organize	their	economic	activities.	
This	expectation	is	consistent	with	a	growing	body	of	research	suggesting	that	
extensive	‘vertical	disaggregation’	and	use	of	collaborative	development	and	
outsourcing	have	become	virtual	norms	in	growing	numbers	of	industries	based	on	
open‐system,	modular	architectures	(Sanchez,	2008;	Cabigioso,	Zirpoli,	and	
Camuffo,	2012;	MacDuffie,	2013;	Kotha	and	Srikanth,	2013).17			
	 Moreover,	in	a	globalizing	world	in	which	capabilities	of	firms	are	rapidly	
rising—and	in	which	any	single	firm	is	therefore	less	and	less	likely	to	have	all	the	
capabilities	needed	to	develop	and	produce	successful	products	on	its	own	
(McDermott,	Mudambi,	and	Parente,	2013)—the	‘go‐it‐alone’	strategy	inherent	in	
adopting	an	FSA	looks	increasingly	risky	and	unsustainable.	As	growing	numbers	of	
firms	around	the	world	acquire	technological	capabilities	that	enable	them	to	
develop	and	produce	components	and	provide	supporting	services	for	many	kinds	
of	products,	and	as	the	processes	and	benefits	of	coopetition	within	ISAs	become	
better	understood,	more	firms	may	find	it	attractive	to	use	modular	ISAs	rather	than	
modular	or	non‐modular	FSAs	(Sanchez	and	Collins,	2001).	We	suggest	that	the	
lower	transaction	costs	and	increased	value‐capture	benefits	enabled	by	open‐
system	and	modular	architectures	that	we	have	identified	here	help	to	explain	why	
use	of	modular	ISAs	may	become	a	‘dominant	logic’	for	competing	in	many	kinds	of	
product	markets	(Prahalad	and	Bettis,	1988;	Sanchez,	1995,	2008;	Argyres	and	
Bigelow,	2010).	
	
Suggestions	for	further	research	
																																																								
17	Research	also	suggests	some	‘demand‐side’	reasons	why	ISAs	are	appearing	more	
frequently	in	more	industries,	such	as	an	aversion	of	buyers	to	being	locked	into	firm‐
specific	idiosyncratic	architectures	(Arthur,	1994),	the	potential	for	greater	reliability	and	
easier	maintenance	of	ISA	products	compared	to	products	based	on	idiosyncratic	
architectures	(Sanchez,	2008),	and	the	possibility	of	lower	prices	for	products	configured	
within	an	ISA	compared	to	prices	for	products	based	on	idiosyncratic	FSAs	(Garud	and	
Kumaraswamy,	1995;	Sanchez,	1999).	
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A	key	premise	in	our	analysis	of	how	a	firm's	choice	of	architectures	may	affect	its	
potential	gains	from	specialization	and	trade	is	the	prospect	that	firms	in	an	ISA	will	
be	able	to	sell	their	components	and	activities	to	other	firms	participating	in	the	
same	ISA.	By	now	the	‘coopetition	formula’	of	cooperating	upstream	in	the	
development,	production,	and	exchange	of	components	while	competing	
downstream	in	final	product	markets	has	become	a	familiar	and	readily	observable	
phenomenon	in	many	industries	(Sanchez,	2008;	Peng	and	Bourne,	2009;	Peng	et	
al.,	2012).	Thus	far,	however,	both	economics	and	strategy	have	paid	relatively	little	
attention	to	the	emergence	and	functioning	of	markets	for	exchanging	intermediate	
inputs	(i.e.,	components	and	services)	in	modular	ISAs.	Thus	some	shifting	of	focus	
in	strategy	and	economics	research	from	product	market	competition	among	
individual	firms	to	improving	our	understanding	of	how	markets	for	cooperative	
exchanges	of	components	and	activities	emerge	within	modular	ISAs	would	now	
seem	in	order.	Such	research	could	no	doubt	help	to	lay	the	foundation	for	a	more	
informed	view	of	the	strategic	evaluations	that	managers	must	make	in	deciding	the	
most	advantageous	kind	of	architectures	on	which	to	base	the	strategic	organizing	
of	their	firms.	
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